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Abstract A conservative estimate is that 695,000 mentally disordered offenders are arrested
and Mirandized annually in the United States. Past research has focused almost exclusively on
cognitive factors affecting the comprehension of Miranda rights. The current study broadens
the scope by including diagnostic variables and by extending the investigation to basic elements
of Miranda reasoning. A sample of 107 mentally disordered defendants was administered two
research measures, the Miranda Statements Scale (MSS) and Miranda Rights Scale (MRS), in
addition to standardized tests. Most defendants lacked good comprehension of all but the simplest
(Flesch-Kincaid <6th grade) Miranda warnings. Defendants with the poorest understanding
(i.e., comprehending about 25% of the warnings) had marked deficits in multiple domains
including cognitive abilities (intelligence and comprehension) and general adjustment. Different
background and clinical variables predicted defendants’ abilities to generate reasons either to
exercise or waive their Miranda rights.
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The Miranda decision (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966) enshrined the constitutional protections of
criminal defendants in custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court recognized that suspects
without legal representation were intrinsically disadvantaged by the interrogation process. It
held that procedural safeguards must protect suspects held in incommunicado interrogation,
noting “The entire thrust of police interrogation there, as in all the cases today, was to put
the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment”
R. Rogers () · K. S. Harrison · L. L. Hazelwood · K. W. Sewell
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(p. 465). Based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Court affirmed
defendants’ constitutional rights to silence and to legal counsel.
To provide procedural safeguards, the Court held that custodial suspects must be informed
about their privilege against self-incrimination. The Miranda decision specified the following
(p. 479): “He must be informed prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded
him throughout the interrogation.” According to Rogers and Shuman (2005), the five basic
components of the warning include (a) right to silence, (b) statements used as evidence of guilt,
(c) right to counsel, (d) counsel for indigent defendants, and (e) reassertion of rights at anytime.
While affirming the basic components of the Miranda warning, the Supreme Court subsequently
declined to articulate any specific language that must be used in cautioning a suspect (California
v. Prysock, 1981). Therefore, each jurisdiction is free to establish its own wording of the Miranda
warning.
Rogers, Harrison, Shuman, Sewell, and Hazelwood (in press) conducted a recent survey of
Miranda warnings for federal, state, and county jurisdictions across the United States. They
found a remarkable range in the length and complexity of Miranda warnings and waivers. For
example, Miranda warning-waiver combinations ranged greatly from 49 to 547 words. Like-
wise, Flesch-Kincaid estimates are extended across the full spectrum of reading comprehension
from grade 2.8 to post-college. Beyond length and reading comprehension, Miranda warnings
also evidenced a surprising variability in their content. For instance, some warnings appear to
limit access to an attorney (i.e., they specify “during questioning”) and others state the right
to silence in conditional terms (e.g., “until counsel is available”). In summary, the Rogers
et al. study demonstrated an unexpected heterogeneity in the language and content of Miranda
warnings.
The core requirement of Miranda rights is their understandability. The Court is emphatic
in requiring that the suspect “be informed in clear and unequivocal terms” (pp. 467–468) and
that knowledge is “the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision” (p. 468). Because
Miranda warnings may be presented in written format or orally, both reading and listening
comprehension must be assessed. In a survey of criminal defendants they had represented,
defense counsel estimated that 48.4% did not understand the basics of Miranda at the time they
confessed or made important admissions to law enforcement (Rogers, 2005b).
A substantial number of studies (Cooper, Zapf, & Griffin, 2003; Greenfield, Dougherty,
Jackson, Podboy, & Zimmermann, 2001; Helms, 2003; Helms & Kemp, 2005; Helms & Sinclair,
2006; Rogers et al., in press) has relied solely on reading formulas, specifically the Flesch-
Kincaid, to estimate requisite levels of reading comprehension for Miranda warnings. Given
the specialized meaning of Miranda words (e.g., “exercise”) and use of legal terminology (e.g.,
“waive”), an important empirical question is whether Flesch-Kincaid estimates accurately reflect
the requisite levels of reading comprehension.
Miranda warnings are not required in a written format (Thai v. Mapes, 2005) and oral warnings
are common in community arrests when suspects are read their Miranda rights (Weisselberg,
2006). Listening comprehension must be evaluated separately because it has only a moderate
relationship with reading comprehension (see, e.g., Ransby & Swanson, 2003; Savage, 2001).
Among adults with impaired comprehension, Carlile and Felbinger (1991) found the largest
proportion (41.7%) had adequate reading comprehension but marked deficits in listening com-
prehension. Unfortunately, listening comprehension of Miranda remains virtually unresearched.
As a rare exception, Tupling and Salekin (2005) evaluated listening comprehension in a relatively
small sample of recently arrested defendants. Using Grisso’s (1998) measures, they found that
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listening comprehension was not significantly related to an understanding of Miranda rights,
although it did assist suspects in recognizing the rights when provided with several alternatives.
Beyond rudimentary comprehension, the Miranda decision requires suspects to possess ra-
tional abilities. The Supreme Court in Colorado v. Spring (1987, p. 573) held that “the waiver
must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” As articulated in Iowa v. Tovar (2004, p. 1387),
the Court affirmed that an intelligent waiver requires “the defendant knows what he is doing
and his choice is made with eyes open.” The rational ability to ascertain each choice and its
consequences involves the capacity for suspects to generate reasons to exercise or waive Miranda
rights. Seminal research by Grisso (1998) suggests that adult offenders apply basic reasoning
better to their right to counsel than their right to silence.
Recent studies (see reviews by Grisso, 2003; Oberlander, Goldstein, & Goldstein, 2003) tend
to focus on cognitive factors (e.g., mental retardation) and de-emphasize the combined role of
severe mental disorders and cognitive impairment on Miranda comprehension and decisions.
Severe mental disorders should not be overlooked. Weinstein, Kim, Mack, Malvade, and Saraiya
(2005) estimated their prevalence in correctional settings to range from 6 to 20%. A national
survey of jails by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Ditton, 1999) estimated that 16% of inmates
are diagnosed with Axis I disorders. Focusing on specific disorders, Teplin (1994) randomly
sampled 728 male jail detainees and found 3.0% currently diagnosed with schizophrenia and
4.1% with major mood disorders. Estimates are generally higher among female jail detainees,
especially for mood disorders (Lewis, 2005). With approximately 13.9 million arrests in 2004
(FBI, 2006), even a conservative estimate of 5.0% would suggest that 695,000 defendants
annually were suffering from severe mental disorders at the time of their arrests and subsequent
Miranda warnings.
The current study addresses Miranda warnings in the form of four research questions focused
on mentally disordered defendants. First, what are the necessary levels of reading and listening
comprehension required to understand the basic concepts of the Miranda warnings at different
Flesch-Kincaid grade-estimates? Second, what cognitive (i.e., intelligence, reading comprehen-
sion, and listening comprehension) and diagnostic (i.e., Axis I symptoms and Global Assessment
Functioning) variables are useful in classifying the level (e.g., “poor” <50%; “good” 70–89%;
and excellent ≥90%) of understanding? Third, what are the common reasons considered by
defendants in deciding to exercise or waive their Miranda rights? Fourth, which cognitive and
diagnostic variables predict defendants’ capacity to generate reasons for exercising or waiving
their Miranda rights?
Method
This study was approved jointly by Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation
(TDMHMR) Central Office Institutional Review Board and the University of North Texas
Institutional Review Board. It is part of programmatic research on Miranda understanding that
is supported by the Law and Social Sciences Program of the National Science Foundation.
Participants
Defendants were recruited from competency-to-stand-trial units at the Vernon campus of North
Texas State Hospital. The sample is composed of 84 male and 23 female defendants with a mean
age of 38.95 (SD = 11.45) years. Regarding self-identified ethnicity, the sample consists of 40
(36.7%) African Americans, 40(36.7%) European Americans, 22 (20.2%) Hispanic Americans,
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and 5(4.6%) other/biracial. Most of the sample had some high school education (M = 11.42;
SD = 2.17), but relatively few (19.8%) had completed at least one year of college. For current
criminal charges, the most serious offenses typically involved aggression against others that
included murder/manslaughter (11 or 10.3%), aggravated assault (36 or 33.6%), sexual assault
(5 or 4.7%), and assault (24 or 22.4%). Smaller numbers were involved in property offenses:
robbery (11 or 10.3%), auto theft (2 or 1.9%), and burglary (1 or 0.9%).
Most patients (76 or 71.0%) had psychotic diagnoses on their charts, comprised mainly
of Psychotic Disorder, NOS (40 or 37.4%), Schizoaffective Disorders (20 or 18.7%), and
Schizophrenia (14 or 13.1%). Bipolar Disorders (10 or 9.3%), other mood disorders (9 or
8.4%), and dementia/cognitive disorders (6 or 5.7%) were less common. Regarding comor-
bidity, polysubstance abuse/dependence was frequently observed (39 or 36.4%), followed by
alcohol abuse/dependence (14 or 13.1%), and specific types of substance abuse (10 or 9.3%).
Standardized measures
Participants were administered a battery of standardized tests and research scales that are listed
and described. As part of the programmatic research on Miranda, several additional scales were
given that are not part of the current investigation. They include four measures of interper-
sonal responses to authority: (a) the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS; Gudjonsson, 1997),
(b) the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989), (c) Gudjonsson Confession
Questionnaire-Revised (GCQ-R; Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1999), and (d) the Interrogation
Acquiescence Scale (IAS; Harrison & Rogers, 2005). In addition, participants were asked to de-
fine a list of vocabulary words that have been used in Miranda warnings. The following measures
were used in the current investigation:
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI)
The WASI (Wechsler, 1999) is a well-validated intelligence test composed of four scales (Vocab-
ulary, Similarities, Block Design, and Matrix Reasoning) that measure both verbal and nonverbal
intellectual abilities. The WASI has exceptional reliability (i.e., rs > .90) and correlates highly
with the comprehensive WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997) as a measure of both verbal (r = .88) and
overall (r = .92) intelligence.
Wechsler Individual Achievement Test 2nd Edition (WIAT-II)
The WIAT-II (Psychological Corporation, 2002) Reading Comprehension and Listening Com-
prehension subtests yield grade-equivalent scores. The WIAT-II is highly reliable (i.e., rs for
subtests from .80 to .98) and has excellent normative data for adult populations.
Schedule of Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia-Change Version (SADS-C)
The SADS-C (Spitzer & Endicott, 1978) is designed to evaluate key dimensions of psychopathol-
ogy. The SADS-C has impressive interrater reliability (M ICC = .95). For use with jail samples,
Rogers, Jackson, Salekin and Neumann (2003) found a good model fit (CFI = .92; RCFI = .95)
via confirmatory factor analysis for its four clinical scales: Psychosis, Mania, Dysphoria, and
Insomnia. The SADS-C also yields an estimate of overall impairment that corresponds to the
Global Assessment Functioning (GAF).
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Slosson Oral Reading Test-Revision 3 (SORT-R3)
The SORT-R3 (Slosson & Nicholson, 2002) is a brief (3–5 minutes) reliable screen for reading
level that correlates at .90 with reading comprehension on the Woodcock Johnson. The SORT-R3
addressed an ancillary objective, namely whether custodial suspects with limited reading ability
could be effectively screened.
Research scales
A critical component of this study was further validation of the Miranda Statements Scale (MSS;
Rogers et al., in press) and the initial development of the Miranda Rights Scale (MRS). Their
development and validation will be examined in detail.
Miranda Statements Scale (MSS)
Rogers et al. (in press) developed the MSS to provide representative Miranda components at
different reading levels. In subsequent paragraphs, we describe its development as a research
scale and scoring of categories.
The first step in the MSS development was to assemble the 789 unique statements from 560
Miranda warnings for the five Miranda components (Rogers et al., in press). Flesch-Kincaid
reading estimates were used to organize the unique statements into five grade levels: < 6, 6.0
to 7.9, 8 to 9.9, 10 to 11.9, and ≥12. For each grade level, three Miranda experts independently
selected the two most representative versions for each Miranda component. As evidence of
construct validity, experts reached a high concordance (98.0%) for representative components
at the second iteration (see Rogers et al., in press). For the second step, two parallel versions
were developed by randomly assigning one of each pair of representative components to either
MSS-A or MSS-B. Five Miranda warnings of increasing reading difficulty were thus created for
each version. For example, MSS-A1 consists of five warning components and a waiver, all at a
Flesch-Kincaid reading level <6 grade. At the other end of the spectrum, MSS-A5 consists of
five warning components and a waiver at ≥12 reading level.
The MSS is scored by defendants’ ability to state in their own words the content of each
warning, which is organized by categories. The general categories for scoring the MSS were
derived from the content analysis of the 560 Miranda warnings. Rogers et al. (in press) had
established basic categorical distinctions, which use common characteristics to define a compo-
nent or category (Krippendorf, 2004). These categorical distinctions are referred to as “Miranda
components.” Rogers et al. found that Miranda components would be reliably identified by
independent raters with a M kappa of .88 (range from .82 to .96). Because the MSS does not
cover all the categorical distinctions found in the 560 Miranda warnings, non-relevant categories
were eliminated. This simplification of the scoring categories necessitated a further testing of
their reliability (see Results).
Because Supreme Court decisions make no effort to quantify levels of comprehension, we
operationalized three categories on the MSS apriori: (a) “poor understanding” for less than 50%
comprehension, (b) “good understanding” for 70 to 89% comprehension, and (c) “excellent
understanding” for 90% or higher.1 Our rationale for poor comprehension was simply based on
1 We considered but rejected a more elaborate approach that would attempt to assess understanding of “core”
components separately. The problem is operationalization. For example, some appellate courts have held that
Miranda warnings must specify “prior to questioning” (i.e., a core component) while others have not (see Rogers
et al., in press).
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the defendant’s failure to grasp even half of the relevant material. For good comprehension, we
set the standard at 70%, which allows considerable leeway for errors and omissions. Finally,
excellent understanding was used to designate nearly complete comprehension ( ≥90%). We
fully recognize that appellate courts and legal scholars may wish to consider propounding more
stringent standards, or alternatively, relaxing the minimum level of accuracy.
Miranda Rights Scale (MRS)
The MRS (Rogers, 2005a) is a research scale that asks participants to express the possible
advantages and disadvantages on four Miranda-related issues considering their own cases: (a)
waiving their right to silence, (b) exercising their right to silence, (c) waiving their right to an
attorney, and (d) exercising their right to an attorney. Consistent with Iowa v. Tovar (2004, p. 1387)
requiring that custodial suspects must be aware of their options and their likely consequences, the
MRS is a rationally constructed scale that provides defendants with an opportunity to describe
their reasons for waiving or exercising their Miranda rights. Examples regarding the right to
silence include the following:
 Waive right to silence: “Thinking of your own case, what would be some good reasons to talk
with police without an attorney?”
 Exercise right to silence: “What are possible problems with you talking with police without
an attorney?”
One objective of the current study was to develop scoring categories for the MRS and to test
its reliability.
Procedure
Potential participants were approached individually about their possible involvement in the
study. To be as representative as possible, only minimal exclusion criteria were used (a) lack
of fluency in English, (b) inability to give written informed consent, and (c) recently violent
behavior that would put researchers at risk. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either
the MSS-A or MSS-B. To minimize ordering effects, the five versions of Miranda warnings were
administered in one of three sequences: either the original format from easiest (<6th grade) to
most difficult ( ≥12 grade) or one of two sequences with a randomized order.
After providing written informed consent, participants were tested in two sessions in private
offices on the competency restoration unit. In the first session, they were administered the SADS-
C, WASI, Reading Comprehension, and Listening Comprehension subtests of the WIAT, three
Miranda warnings from the MSS, and the IAQ. To keep the five MSS warnings as separate
as possible, other measures were interspersed between each MSS warning. Testing began with
the first MSS Miranda warning followed by the SADS-C, an interview-based measure used to
facilitate rapport. A similar sequence was maintained for the remainder of the first session: (a)
the WASI and SORT followed by the second MSS Miranda warning, and (b) the WIAT subtests
and IAQ followed by the third MSS Miranda warning. The first session was approximately 21/2
to 3 hr in duration.
On the following day, the second session was administered by an independent researcher who
was masked to the results of the first session. The GSS and the fourth MSS Miranda warning
were the first two measures administered. The participants were then asked to define a list of
Miranda words. The next measures were the GCS, MRS, GCQ-R, and GSS-delayed. The final
measure was the fifth MSS Miranda warning. The second session was substantially shorter than
the first, averaging 11/2 hr.
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Participants were given an opportunity to ask questions about the study at the conclusion
of the second session. In addition, they were provided with nominal compensation ($5.00 per
session) to their trust funds for their participation.
Results
Descriptive data
Table 1 summarizes the quantifiable clinical and background data available for these pretrial
defendants. For comparative purposes, we also examined differences on these variables for the
lowest ( <35.4%) and highest ( >60.7%) quartiles in overall comprehension as measured by the
MSS. Regarding background variables, no differences were found for prior arrests whereas years
of education produced a significant but comparatively small effect size (d = .65 with a grade
difference of 1.36 years). Age yielded the largest effect size (d = 1.11) for background variables
with the lowest quartile being approximately 10 years older than the highest quartile. For clinical
variables, very large differences (Cohen’s ds > 1.50) were found for intelligence, and reading
and listening comprehension. Constellations of Axis I symptoms were nonsignificant, although
moderately large differences were found for overall impairment (i.e., GAF; d = .86).
Table 1 Descriptive data on the entire sample and comparisons of mentally disordered defendants
with Miranda comprehension in the lowest and highest quartiles
Entire sample Lowest quartile Highest quartile
Scale M SD M SD M SD F d
Age 38.95 11.45 44.96 8.85 34.32 10.31 15.69∗∗∗ 1.11
Education 11.42 2.17 10.72 2.07 12.08 2.10 5.22∗ .65
Prior arrests 11.69 28.35 10.52 20.25 8.08 8.67 .31 .16
WASI FIQ 81.08 14.45 70.42 10.48 92.68 13.42 43.77∗∗∗ 1.85
WASI VIQ 78.61 14.52 68.54 11.71 88.92 14.61 30.33∗∗∗ 1.54
Vocabulary 34.08 10.82 26.23 8.23 41.12 10.38 32.37∗∗∗ 1.59
Similarities 36.76 11.12 30.15 9.58 45.36 9.68 31.80∗∗∗ 1.58
WASI PIQ 86.55 15.14 76.65 9.88 96.88 14.18 35.16∗∗∗ 1.66
Block design 40.34 9.86 34.96 7.62 45.68 9.50 19.82∗∗∗ 1.25
Matrix reasoning 41.77 11.72 34.04 8.72 50.12 10.80 34.35∗∗∗ 1.64
WIAT listening 75.28 18.65 61.28 16.17 87.56 13.57 38.76∗∗∗ 1.76
WIAT reading 67.51 16.62 55.29 10.60 80.21 16.90 37.45∗∗∗ 1.77
Slosson reading 159.98 43.93 122.90 61.83 183.12 19.29 21.32∗∗∗ 1.37
SADS GAF 43.70 12.20 40.08 11.17 49.16 9.86 9.45∗∗ .86
SADS Psychotic 7.51 3.44 7.31 3.46 7.72 3.47 .18 .12
SADS mania 7.35 2.81 7.50 2.86 7.20 2.80 .14 .11
SADS dysphoria 12.90 4.79 12.38 4.89 13.44 4.73 .61 .22
SADS insomnia 2.27 2.02 2.35 2.24 2.20 1.80 .07 .07
Note. The lowest quartile (n = 26) is comprised of Miranda comprehension < 35.4% (M = 23.70%;
SD = 7.60%). The highest quartile (n = 25) is comprised of Miranda comprehension > 60.7%
(M = 65.78%; SD = 5.19%).
∗significant at p < .05.
∗∗significant at p < .01.
∗∗∗significant at p < .001.
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MRS scoring
The MRS is composed of open-ended questions that provide the possibility that some defendants
may generate large numbers of responses. In the current study, however, most MRS items
(87.6%) averaged 1 or fewer responses per inquiry. To avoid problems with outliers, we scored
each defendant’s best response. Responses were scored as either “0” or “1.” A “0” score was
the absence of a coherent, nonpsychotic response (i.e., no response, an unintelligible answer,
or a psychotic reason). A “1” score was the presence of one or more coherent, nonpsychotic
reasons. Each of the four categories (i.e., exercise-silence, exercise-counsel, waive-silence, and
waive-counsel) has two questions with possible scores ranging from 0 to 2.
Reliability of the MSS and MRS
The interrater reliability for the MSS-A and MSS-B scoring categories was examined by ran-
domly selecting 30 cases. Two independent raters achieved a very high level of agreement of
96.3%. Most Miranda components were accurately paraphrased by at least five participants and
were used to compute kappa coefficients. For MSS-A, the mean kappa for individual Miranda
components was .89 (SD = .12) with a range from .53 to 1.00. For MSS-B, kappas averaged
.92 (SD = .11) with a range from .51 to 1.00. Overall, the kappas demonstrated a high level of
interrater reliability.2
The scoring reliability of the MRS was evaluated on 30 randomly selected cases with two
independent raters. Given the number of scoring categories (i.e., 9 to 14) for each MRS item,
the interrater reliability was very good with a mean kappa of .84 and a range from .68 to .95.
Comprehension levels on the MSS
The apriori goal of establishing poor, good, and excellent understanding of the MSS components
was not realized because so few defendants achieved the 90% criterion for excellent understand-
ing. The numbers ranged from 7 (6.7%) for the MSS warning below grade 6 to 1 (0.9%) for
those Flesch-Kincaid categories at grade 10 and higher. Therefore, the “good understanding”
category was expanded to 70% or higher.
A key finding for this sample of mentally disordered defendants was the small proportion
of defendants able to achieve good understanding at any Flesch-Kincaid category. The per-
centages of good understanding for each Flesch-Kincaid category are summarized: <6th grade
category = 36.4%; 6–7.9 grade category = 11.2%; 8–9.9 grade category = 9.3%; 10–11.9
grade category = 10.3%; ≥ 12 grade category = 6.5%. Logically, the percentages for poor
understanding manifested the opposite trend: <6th grade category = 31.8%; 6–7.9 grade cate-
gory = 46.7%; 8–9.9 grade category = 49.5%; 10–11.9 grade category = 47.7%; ≥ 12 grade
category = 64.5%. The key finding is that representative Miranda warnings with Flesch-Kincaid
estimates at or above the 6th grade level are only well understood by approximately 10% of
the mentally disordered defendants, even though they tended to be only in the midrange of
impairment (M GAF = 43.70 with a range from 20 to 65) for clinical populations. At the highest
category ( ≥12 grade), nearly two-thirds of the defendants exhibited a poor understanding of
Miranda.
2 The kappas with few observations ( < 5) are often attenuated by low base rates. However, the current data suggest
good reliability for both the MSS-A (M = .81; SD = .16) and MSS-B (M = .86; SD = .18).
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Table 2 WIAT grade equivalents for poor ( <50%) and good ( ≥70%) understanding for
representative Miranda warnings at different Flesch-Kincaid categories
Poor understanding Good understanding
Categories M SD M SD F d
Reading
<6 4.20 2.64 7.53 2.91 25.93∗ 1.19
6–7.9 4.73 2.91 8.42 2.44 16.35∗ 1.31
8–9.9 4.74 3.10 8.70 2.77 14.06∗ 1.30
10–11.9 4.30 2.49 9.21 3.34 30.86∗ 1.85
≥12 5.14 2.96 7.32 2.68 3.03 0.74
Listening
< 6 5.05 3.58 8.00 3.03 14.52∗ 0.89
6–7.9 5.57 3.47 9.52 2.54 13.69∗ 1.19
8–9.9 5.47 3.14 10.10 2.73 19.04∗ 1.50
10–11.9 5.25 3.29 9.39 2.46 15.41∗ 1.31
≥12 5.84 3.48 7.71 2.84 1.89 0.54
Note. ∗ = p < .001.
WIAT grade equivalents were generated for poor versus good understanding of represen-
tative Miranda warnings (see Table 2). The most salient finding is that defendants with good
understanding averaged above the 7th grade level in both reading and listening comprehension.
This finding holds irrespective of the Flesch-Kincaid estimate, including the lowest category
(< 6th grade). Average WIAT reading grade equivalents increase gradually with the higher
Flesch-Kincaid categories. The singular exception is the highest category ( ≥12 grade) which
has only 6 defendants of whom two had low reading scores (i.e., WIAT reading equivalents of
4.4 and 4.6). A potential complication in establishing WIAT grade equivalents is prior exposure
to Miranda warnings via the criminal justice system and popular media. In other words, defen-
dants may not be relying solely on their immediate comprehension in paraphrasing Miranda
components.
An inspection of frequency distributions revealed that very low WIAT reading grade equiva-
lents ( ≤2.0) consistently indicated poor Miranda understanding with a Positive Predictive Power
(PPP) = 1.00 and specificity = 1.00. As expected, this very low cut score has only modest sen-
sitivity (.27). Even slightly less efficient, SORT-R3 total scores (cut score for failure <110)
yielded excellent specificity (.97) and good PPP (.88) with a very modest sensitivity (.22).
Potential determinants of Miranda understanding
The original goal was to examine the classification of Miranda understanding (poor, good,
and excellent) at different Flesch-Kincaid categories. As noted, the excellent category was
inapplicable to the current sample and was eliminated. Only the lowest Flesch-Kincaid category
(<6th grade) had adequate representation of poor (n = 34) and good (n = 39) understanding.
Stepwise discriminant analyses were performed on cognitive and diagnostic variables separately.
To maintain an adequate subject-to-variable ratio (20:1), each discriminant model was limited to
a maximum of three variables. For the cognitive variables, only WIAT Reading comprehension
entered with a Wilks’ lambda [1, 71] = .808 (F = 16.42, p < .001) accounting for 19.2% of
the variance. For the diagnostic variables, GAF and SADS Dysphoria subscale entered (Wilks’
lambda [2, 73] = .930, F = 7.16, p = .001) and accounted for a similar percentage of the
variance (i.e., 17.0%).
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The final discriminant model combined cognitive and diagnostic variables for the classifica-
tion of poor and good Miranda understanding. The discriminant model was significant (Wilks’
lambda [2, 71] = .752; F = 11.24, p < .001). Only two variables entered the discriminant func-
tion with the following standardized canonical coefficients: WIAT reading comprehension (.779)
and GAF (.534). Accounting for 24.8% of the variance, the model correctly predicted 72.6%
of the cases. It was slightly better at predicting poor understanding (Sensitivity = .76) than
good understanding (Specificity = .69). In examining the structure matrix, three variables were
moderately correlated with the discriminant function: Verbal IQ (.66), listening comprehension
(.66), and Performance IQ (.53).
Reasons related to Miranda decisions
Defendants are faced with a critical decision on whether to exercise or waive their Miranda
rights to silence and to legal counsel. Common responses ( ≥ 5%) to the MRS are categorized in
Table 3. Reasons for waiving rights include an opportunity to prove one’s innocence, apparent
ability to handle the defense, and perceived financial limitations. Most defendants saw advantages
to exercising the right to silence for avoiding incrimination (63.6%), and counsel for assisting
in the defense (83.2%). Interestingly, comparable numbers believed they were capable (19.6%)
or incapable (21.5%) of handling their own defense.
Rational decisions about Miranda require the capacity to generate coherent, nonpsychotic
reasons for exercising or waiving rights. Table 4 summarizes the data on mentally disordered
defendants’ capacity to generate nonpsychotic reasons for waiving and exercising Miranda
rights. Approximately one-fourth of the mentally disordered defendants could not generate a
single reason for why they should exercise their Miranda right to silence. A smaller number
(16.2%) had a similar problem with their right to counsel. Taken together, 6.3% expressed no
rational idea why they should exercise either of their constitutional protections.
A potentially contentious issue is whether valid reasons commonly exist for waiving constitu-
tional protections; the Miranda decision acknowledged the grave perils of participating in police
interrogations. For our purposes, we simply tabulated nonpsychotic reasons for waiving Miranda
rights to silence and counsel. While only about half (54.1%) failed to generate any reasons to
waive silence, very few (8.1%) had a similar problem with waiving the right to counsel.
We explored how cognitive and diagnostic variables predicted the capacity to generate nonpsy-
chotic reasons to exercise Miranda rights via dominance analysis. Dominance analysis (Bude-
scu, 1993; Azen & Budescu, 2003) is an application of hierarchical multiple regression that
exhaustively evaluates the unique and shared contributions of predictor variables in relation to a
criterion. Its primary advantage over traditional regression methods is its ability to identify the
unique contributions of each variable, taking into account other predictor variables. Potential
predictors were chosen by utilizing the variables that were significantly correlated (p ≤ .05) with
each criterion: nonpsychotic reasons for (a) exercising Miranda rights and (b) waiving Miranda
rights.
In exercising Miranda rights, Verbal IQ and Listening Comprehension were the strongest
predictors, when considered alone (zero-order), accounting for about 10% or more of the variance
(see Table 5). When one or two predictors were entered first, Verbal IQ maintained its prominence
with an incremental change in variance (R2 > 5.0%). Finally, we examined the unique variance
for predictors after all other variables were entered first. English as a first language contributed
unique variance (R2 = 2.5%) in predicting nonpsychotic reasons to exercise Miranda rights.
Two diagnostic variables also emerged with unique variance, specifically GAF and Mania
subscale.
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Table 3 Common reasons ( ≥ 5%) for waiving and exercising Miranda rights
Decision Right Reason %
Waive Silence Innocent (e.g., prove he or she is not guilty) 17.8
Police will get angry or upset 7.5
Police will think I am guilty 6.5
To cooperate 5.6
To get information, ask questions 5.6
Counsel Defend yourself, choose defense, handle it yourself 19.6
Can’t afford an attorney 17.8
Can’t trust the attorney’s allegiance 6.5
Attorney is not serious about the case 5.6
Exercise Silence Avoid incrimination 63.6
The police lie or misrepresent 19.6
To wait for a lawyer 17.8
Protect my rights 11.2
Force or coerce you, entrap you 9.3
Could add another criminal charge 6.5
Don’t like the police or don’t trust them 5.6
Have something to hide; I don’t have to lie to the police 5.6
Counsel Assist me with my case 83.2
Poor job at self-representation; need attorney’s expertise 21.5
Case will be postponed; spend a long time in jail 16.8
Self-incrimination 11.2
Get convicted; bad verdict 10.3
Reduce my sentence (e.g., plea bargain) 9.3
Not have legal knowledge of an attorney 9.3
Longer, harsher sentences 8.4
Provide me with knowledge of the law 7.5
Help me generally (not about the legal case) 7.5
Arrange bail/bond 5.6
In waiving Miranda rights, predictors included cognitive abilities and gender, but no diagnostic
variables (see Table 6). At the zero-order level, reading and listening comprehension explained
close to 10% of the variance (R2 = .098). Gender (i.e., being female) always added significantly
to the first and second-order regressions (Proportion = 1.00). Gender also added the most
unique variance. When all other variables were considered, gender still accounted for 4.1% of
the variance.
Table 4 Nonpsychotic reasons to exercise and waive Miranda rights to silence and counsel
Exercise Miranda Waive Miranda
Rights M SD % at 0 M SD % at 0
Silence 1.07 .78 27.0 .59 .71 54.1
Counsel 1.32 .74 16.2 1.17 .55 8.1
Total 2.39 1.15 6.3 1.76 .97 6.3
Note. % at 0 = The percentage of cases for which no nonpsychotic reasons were generated.
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Table 5 Predictors of nonpsychotic reasons to exercise Miranda rights using dominance analysis
Zero order Predictors R2 R2 Beta p
Non-English .043 .043 − .207 .025
Verbal IQ .131 .131 .363 .000
Performance IQ .051 .051 .226 .016
Reading comprehension .083 .083 .288 .003
Listening comprehension .097 .097 .311 .002
GAF .033 .033 .182 .043
Mania subscale .030 .030 .174 .050
First order Predictors R2 R2 Beta Proportion
Non-English .108 .038 − .193 1.000
Verbal IQ .144 .071 .341 1.000
Performance IQ .095 .025 .132 .500
Reading comprehension .110 .046 .208 .667
Listening comprehension .118 .056 .244 .667
GAF .104 .031 .173 .333
Mania subscale .106 .033 .180 .667
Second order Predictors R2 R2 Beta Proportion
Non-English .147 .033 − .183 .800
Verbal IQ .158 .058 .314 1.000
Performance IQ .129 .010 .068 .200
Reading comprehension .136 .023 .147 .333
Listening comprehension .139 .029 .187 .400
GAF .146 .030 .174 .533
Mania subscale .148 .034 .185 .867
Sixth order Predictors R2 R2 Beta p
Non-English .222 .025 − .171 .050
Verbal IQ .222 .016 .235 .093
Performance IQ .222 .000 − .028 .419
Reading comprehension .222 .001 .053 .369
Listening comprehension .222 .001 .059 .358
GAF .222 .038 .214 .024
Mania subscale .222 .038 .207 .023
Note. p = significance (two-tail); proportion = The proportion of regressions in which the predictor
variable was significant (p ≤ .05).
Discussion
Melton, Petrila, Poythress, and Slobogin (1997) found that public defenders expressed significant
concerns about their defendants’ pretrial competencies because of their mental capacities. Their
estimates ranged from 7.9% to 14.8% (see footnote 93, p. 669). Even if Miranda issues were
salient in only a minority of such cases,3 thousands of mentally disordered defendants are likely
impaired in their Miranda understanding and subsequent decisions.
Miranda comprehension
A major thrust of this research was to examine differences in Miranda comprehension levels.
The initial analysis (Table 1) provided a very general perspective that used overall Miranda
3 Defense attorneys would likely argue that impaired Miranda abilities are only relevant when defendants waive
their rights and provide inculpatory information.
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Table 6 Predictors of nonpsychotic reasons to waive Miranda rights using dominance analysis
Zero order Predictors R2 R2 Beta p
Gender .045 .045 − .213 .015
Verbal IQ .072 .072 .268 .003
Performance IQ .037 .037 .192 .026
Reading comprehension .098 .098 .313 .001
Listening comprehension .098 .098 .313 .001
Target words .032 .032 .180 .034
First order Predictors R2 R2 Beta Proportion
Gender .111 .043 − .208 1.000
Verbal IQ .098 .036 .087 .600
Performance IQ .083 .014 .085 .400
Reading comprehension .114 .057 .269 .800
Listening comprehension .111 .054 .265 .800
Target words .089 .019 .136 .400
Second order Predictors R2 R2 Beta Proportion
Gender .138 .043 − .207 1.000
Verbal IQ .118 .016 .130 .300
Performance IQ .113 .003 .022 .100
Reading comprehension .129 .035 .239 .700
Listening comprehension .125 .029 .222 .400
Target words .119 .012 .112 .000
Fifth order Predictors R2 R2 Beta p
Gender .164 .041 − .205 .017
Verbal IQ .164 .001 .055 .371
Performance IQ .164 .001 − .042 .371
Reading comprehension .164 .016 .199 .094
Listening comprehension .164 .006 .121 .222
Target words .164 .005 .073 .228
Note. p = significance (two-tail); proportion = The proportion of regressions in which the predictor
variable was significant (p ≤ .05).
comprehension (i.e., M percentage of MSS total scores) to compare the lowest (average compre-
hension = 23.7%) and highest (average comprehension = 65.8%). The verbal intelligence of
those in this lowest category (M = 68.54) represents severe deficits that are 20 points lower than
those in the highest quartile (M = 88.92). These differences are paralleled for both reading (d =
1.77) and listening (d = 1.76) comprehension. When WIAT standard scores are transformed
into grade equivalents, the lowest quartile represents very low grades for reading (M = 3.36;
SD = 2.15) and listening (M = 4.04; SD = 2.86) comprehension. In summary, those defen-
dants with a very poor grasp of Miranda components had severely impaired cognitive abilities
involving both their tested intelligence and achievement levels.
On average, the mentally disordered defendants fell in the midrange of psychological impair-
ment (M GAF = 43.70); this category (41 to 50) is used to designate either serious symptoms or
any serious impairment. Defendants in the lowest quartile were likely to manifest more impaired
GAF categories: (a) 38.5% for 31–40 GAF (i.e., impaired reality testing/communication or major
impairment), and (b) 19.2% for 21–30 GAF (i.e., psychotically based behavior, severe problems
with communication/judgment, or gross impairment). In contrast, comparatively few defendants
in the highest quartile met these GAF categories (28.0% and 0.0% respectively). Interestingly, no
differences were observed in symptom constellations including psychotic symptoms. The com-
parative importance of cognitive abilities over diagnostic variables was unexpected in light of
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the chart diagnoses, which emphasized psychotic and other Axis I disorders and de-emphasized
mental retardation (0.0%) and dementia/cognitive disorders (5.7%). One plausible explanation is
that functional impairment, brought on by symptoms of Axis I disorders, is negatively affecting
cognitive performance.
A detailed analysis of Miranda comprehension focused on defendants’ capacities to under-
stand representative warnings at different Flesch-Kincaid levels. A basic but crucial finding
was that mentally disordered defendants in the current study had widespread difficulties in un-
derstanding all but the simplest warnings. Importantly, these difficulties occurred despite their
past experiences with the criminal justice system (M = 11.69 arrests) and averaging close to a
high school education (M = 11.42 years). This finding underscores the importance of research
focused on mentally disordered offenders. In the general population, prior arrests appear to
contribute to a better understanding of Miranda (Grisso, 1981). Based on the present data, the
backgrounds of mentally disordered defendants (i.e., arrests and education) cannot be considered
effective screens for which defendants should be evaluated for their Miranda comprehension.
Based on our apriori standards, we were surprised at how few mentally disordered defendants
evidenced good comprehension across the Flesch-Kincaid categories. Even at the lowest Flesch-
Kincaid category (<6th grade), only 36.4% evidenced a good grasp of the Miranda components.
Moreover, these percentages of good comprehension plummeted (i.e., <12.0%) with more
difficult Flesch-Kincaid categories. One hypothesis for these poor overall performances was that
most mentally disordered defendants lacked the ability to focus on many ideas irrespective of
grade level. To explore this hypothesis, we divided Miranda components into simple (2 or fewer
concepts) and complex (4 or more concepts). We found that defendants evidenced much higher
comprehension for simple (M = .29, SD = .11) than complex (M = .18, SD = .10; F [1,110] =
219.22, p < .001) Miranda components.
Good comprehension of Miranda components relies on several clinical predictors. Key vari-
ables entering the discriminant function were reading comprehension and overall impairment.
This finding suggests that determinations of Miranda comprehension should effectively evaluate
two domains: cognitive abilities and Axis I impairment. More extensive evaluations of diagnos-
tic data will likely be helpful in pinpointing specific areas of impairment critical to Miranda
comprehension.
Miranda reasoning
Bonnie (1992, 1993) formulated a conceptual model for decisional competence that incorporates
four components: understanding, reasoning, appreciation, and decision-making. As the first step
in ascertaining decisional competence, our current data are narrowly focused on reasoning. Our
findings address the defendant’s ability to consider reasons for two basic courses of action,
specifically the capacity to generate reasons regarding whether to exercise or waive Miranda
rights. Given the elapsed time since their arrests, we did not attempt to reconstruct their own
thinking at the time of arrest.4 Instead, we focused on their present abilities to generate reasons,
which could be compared directly to their current cognitive and psychological functioning.
The majority of defendants (63.6%) appeared to appreciate the adversarial process at least as
it applies to exercising the right to silence to avoid incrimination. Some defendants expressed
concerns about the police’s probity and tactics. Such concerns may be justified because law
enforcement is allowed to engage in deceptive practices (see Miranda v. United States, 1966).
4 The MRS does ask for the defendant’s reasons for talking or not talking to law enforcement; these data were not
analyzed because of the extended interval.
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Most defendants (83.2%) recognize in general terms that legal expertise may assist them in their
cases. Regarding specific reasons, these defendants emphasize the outcome (e.g., conviction and
sentencing) and the process (e.g., bail and delays). Relatively few (11.2%) expressed protection
against self-incrimination as reason to exercise the right to counsel.
Blatant misestimation of abilities appears to be the most prominent theme in generating
reasons for waiving Miranda protections. Salient examples include defendants’ beliefs they
could handle the case themselves (19.6%) and prove their innocence (17.8%). This latter finding
appears to stem from a “naı¨ve belief in the power of their own innocence to set them free”
(Kassin, 2005, p. 218). Despite their recent exposure to Miranda warnings, many defendants
apparently had difficulty in applying key information (i.e., free legal assistance) to their own
case. A major reason for not requesting an attorney was the inaccurate belief that the defendant
was responsible for covering the legal fees. If extensively cross-validated, the impact of this
belief may be profound, potentially affecting one in six mentally disordered defendants.
Small numbers of defendants may be motivated to waive their Miranda right to silence as
an appeasement to police investigators. Such appeasements may reflect either a desire to appear
cooperative or an avoidance of negative perceptions. The role of placating reasons in Miranda
decision making deserves further investigation, especially in light of research on suggestibility
and compliance (Gudjonsson, 2003).
An important and unexpected finding was that different clinical variables appear to affect
defendants’ capacity to generate nonpsychotic reasons for exercising and waiving Miranda rights.
For exercising Miranda rights, Verbal IQ was the strongest zero-order predictor followed by
listening comprehension. Even when several other variables are considered, Verbal IQ continues
to add incremental usefulness. However, diagnostic variables also play a significant role. When
all other variables are considered, GAF and the Mania subscale contribute unique variance.5
Despite the importance of verbal abilities and comprehension, practitioners should systematically
evaluate diagnostic issues with coverage of Axis I and Axis II disorders and their concomitant
impairment.
Linguistic and cultural issues must be considered in the comprehensive assessment of
Miranda-related abilities (Johnson & Torres, 1992). In the current study, English as a second
language consistently predicted a decreased ability to generate reasons for exercising Miranda
rights. Even when all clinical variables were considered, non-English contributed unique vari-
ance. This finding could reflect decreased linguistic abilities and problems with vocabulary.6
Alternatively, first and second-generation Mexican Americans may have different views of po-
lice, arrests, and interrogations (Crowle, 2006). Although the majority Non-English defendants
(54.5%) were Hispanic, we do not have data to test this hypothesis.
The ability to generate nonpsychotic reasons to possibly waive Miranda rights is best predicted
by the defendant’s reading and listening comprehension. Surprisingly, none of the diagnostic
variables correlated with reasons to waive and were excluded from further analyses. Verbal IQ
was salient at the zero-order level but appeared far less important when other variables, such as
comprehension, were considered. Gender contributed substantially to unique variance (4.1%)
with women generating more reasons to waive rights. Even when normative data are available
(Grisso, 1998), gender differences have remained uninvestigated. This finding raises interesting
5 The de-emphasis of cognitive variables in explaining unique variance is at least partially a methodological
artifact. As expected, Verbal and Performance IQ are strongly correlated correlated (r = .65, p < .001) as are
reading and listening comprehension (r = .72, p < 001).
6 As a preliminary analysis, however, we found no significant differences (F [1, 93] = 1.52, p = .22) between
English (M = 34.29, SD = 10.80) and Non-English (M = 30.09, SD = 8.78) defendants on the WASI Vocabulary
scores.
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possibilities, such as the possibility of increased compliance (Gudjonnson & Sigurdsson, 2003)
affecting female defendants’ interest and ability to generate reasons to waive rights and cooperate
with police investigations.
Methodological considerations
The current study is likely to overestimate the abilities of mentally disordered defendants to
understand and apply Miranda warnings. While using defendants detained in a maximum security
facility, no effort was made to approximate the external pressures exerted during the pre-
interrogation process (Kassin & Gudjonnson, 2004). Such research would face formidable ethical
challenges, given the vulnerabilities of this population. In addition, the current research was
conducted in an unhurried manner in a nonadversarial setting. Further decrements in Miranda-
related abilities could be expected in those jurisdictions where the delivery of the Miranda
warning is “rapid and rote” (Oberlander & Goldstein, 2001, p. 459).
A limitation of the current study is that we did not attempt to retrospectively evaluate the
defendant’s functioning at the time of the Miranda decision. For this research to be effective, a
time-lapse model for evaluating Miranda-related abilities is recommended (Rogers, Jordan, &
Harrison, 2004). Using this research paradigm, defendants would be evaluated (a) contempora-
neously (i.e., immediately following their Miranda warnings), and (b) retrospectively (i.e., their
recounting of their comprehension at the Miranda warnings) after a several month interval.
We were concerned that our use of mentally disordered defendants from a competency
restoration unit would limit our sample to severely impaired individuals. However, the defendants
in the current study averaged in the midrange for overall impairment (GAF M = 43.70) and
ranged across the full spectrum in their psychological functioning. The presence in our sample of
multiple Axis I disorders with the co-occurrence of substance abuse diagnoses is characteristic of
clinical populations. Even in community samples, psychotic disorders are typically accompanied
by multiple Axis I diagnoses (see Kessler et al., 2005).
Concluding remarks
Defendants with severe mental disorders have been largely overlooked in Miranda research,
despite their large numbers estimated conservatively at 695,000 annually. This neglect is unfor-
tunate, because even the highest quartile of mental disordered offenders have limited compre-
hension of the Miranda warnings. The study underscores the importance of focusing specifically
on mentally disordered offenders and other clinical samples. Past studies of cognitive deficits
do not generalize to mentally disordered offenders. Likewise, our current findings should not be
extrapolated to youth or mentally retarded populations.
The widespread use of Flesch-Kincaid estimates to ascertain the requisite levels of reading
comprehension for Miranda warnings and waivers deserves further investigation. In the current
study, the lower categories (<6th grade and 6.0 to 7.9 grades) underestimated the needed abilities
at reading comprehension. Conversely, higher levels (8.0 to 9.9 and 10.0 to 11.9 grade levels)
appeared to overestimate the requisite reading level. The current data suggest that most mentally
disordered defendants are likely to need at least a 7th grade reading level to understand even
simple Miranda warnings.
Defense attorneys may assume that criminal defendants have sufficient understanding of the
Miranda rights and waivers based on their educational level and extensive contacts with the
criminal justice system (Rogers, 2006). The current findings question these assumptions, at
least in the case of mentally disordered defendants. On average, defendants with the poorest
understanding had completed the 10th grade and had 10 prior arrests.
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Comprehension of Miranda rights and the capacity for basic reasoning about Miranda rights
appear to be complex multi-determined processes. With both Miranda comprehension and rea-
soning, verbal abilities and psychological impairment appear to play important roles that differ
with the specific process (e.g., reasons to exercise vs. waive rights). Adding further to this
complexity, the defendant’s background may also contribute to Miranda decisions. In looking
forward, a critical issue will be studying how Miranda comprehension and basic reasoning affect
actual decisions in Miranda-waiver cases.
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